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COURT CAN LEARN FROM NEW YORK LAW 
LINDA M. KELLER

 
ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the debate over whether the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court should adopt ex ante guidelines for 
prosecutorial discretion in order to increase transparency and legitimacy. 
It focuses on one of the most ambiguous provisions of the Rome Statute: 
allowing the Prosecutor to decline to prosecute in the “interests of 
justice.” Specifically, this article will examine the experience of New York 
in operationalizing a domestic statutory analogue to the Rome Statute 
provision: dismissal of cases “in furtherance of justice.” An analysis of 
New York law yields three core lessons that carry over to the international 
sphere despite differences in the systems. First, a requirement of a written 
rationale regarding the exercise of discretion does not necessarily yield 
thorough or convincing explanations. This undermines arguments that the 
legitimacy of the International Criminal Court will be enhanced by public 
explanations of prosecutorial discretion. Second, such explanations may 
backfire when the balancing of nebulous factors leads to apparently 
inconsistent or arbitrary reasoning and results, which may undercut the 
credibility of the decision-maker. Finally, the lack of a guiding theory to 
drive the interpretation of ambiguous criteria can lead to more confusion 
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Visiting Professional, International Criminal Court, October 2011–March 2012. All opinions are solely 
those of the author and do not represent the views of the ICC. The author wishes to thank Professors 
Margaret deGuzman, Alexander Greenawalt, Anders Kaye, and Beth van Schaack for insightful 
comments on earlier drafts. 
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than clarity when there is no agreement on the theoretical justifications 
for prosecution, as seen in both the domestic and international systems. 
The experience of New York, therefore, supports skepticism of the efficacy 
of ex ante criteria for the exercise of discretion, particularly for complex 
decisions regarding the interests of justice. If such criteria are nonetheless 
adopted, the New York experience offers suggestions on crafting a more 
effective approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”), particularly the Prosecutor, 
has been criticized for its policy and practices on the selection of situations 
and cases regarding international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes.
1
 Under the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, 
the Prosecutor has the discretion to decline to investigate a situation or 
prosecute a case for several reasons, including the nebulous concept of 
“the interests of justice.”2 Many commentators have asserted that the 
legitimacy of the ICC would be enhanced if ex ante guidelines on 
 
 
 1. See infra note 143. 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/1
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prosecutorial discretion were adopted by the Prosecutor, particularly when 
the Prosecutor declines to investigate or prosecute in the interests of 
justice. Others have countered that guidelines for ambiguous provisions, 
which necessarily entail context-specific balancing tests, will only harm 
the court. All of these scholars are necessarily speculating about how 
particular detailed guidelines would affect the ICC. This article contributes 
to the debate at a time when the recently sworn-in Prosecutor may be 
considering the issue.
3
 The article adds to the discussion by examining the 
decades-long experience of New York’s statutory criteria for dismissals in 
the furtherance of justice, a domestic analogue of declining to prosecute in 
the interests of justice.
4
  
To date, the ICC Prosecutor has not exercised his or her discretion to 
drop a case because of overriding interests of justice. For example, after 
the Ugandan situation was referred to the ICC, certain members of the 
Acholi community in Northern Uganda urged the Prosecutor to suspend 
activity against the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) in the interests of 
justice, specifically, to promote the peace process between the government 
and the LRA.
5
 The Prosecutor, however, rejected this request.
6
 The Pre-
Trial Chamber did not review the decision because it can check the 
Prosecutor’s interests of justice discretion only if the Prosecutor decides 
not to go forward with an investigation or prosecution.
7
  
By contrast, there is a large body of case law in New York dealing with 
dismissals of criminal charges “in furtherance of justice.” An examination 
of a domestic parallel to the interests of justice, however imperfect, can 
shed light on the potential benefits and pitfalls of an enhanced list of 
factors to operationalize “interests of justice” determinations before the 
ICC. Although there are differences in the interests of justice provisions 
 
 
 3. The term of the first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ended in June 2012, when Fatou 
Bensouda was sworn in as Prosecutor. See Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/Pages/office
%20of%20the%20prosecutor.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
 4. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2011). 
 5. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, INT’L CRIM. CT., at 4 (Sept. 
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCO 
TPInterestsOfJustice.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Policy Paper]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53(3)(b). The PTC may, 
on its own initiative, review a decision not to go forward based on the interests of justice; in such a 
case, the Prosecutor’s decision must be confirmed by the PTC. Id. It can review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to proceed on any grounds upon request of the Security Council or State that referred the 
situation to the ICC, but it can only request that the Prosecutor reconsider such a decision. Id. art. 
53(3)(a). 
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and their implementation, there are sufficient similarities to yield lessons 
for the ICC. 
Prior to examining the domestic law, Part I of this article briefly 
describes the ICC and its “interests of justice” provision. Part II examines 
the debate over whether further prosecutorial guidelines should be 
adopted, particularly for the ambiguous phrase, “interests of justice.” It 
summarizes the policies of the Prosecutor regarding interpretation of the 
interests of justice and describes the positions of prominent proponents 
and opponents of prosecutorial guidelines. Part III explains an analogous 
New York statute allowing dismissals in the interest of justice and its ten 
factors guiding discretion. It then compares the “interests of justice” 
provisions in the domestic and international contexts and shows the key 
similarities that would allow the ICC to draw on the experience of New 
York. It shows the potential parallels between the New York criteria and 
the “interests of justice” provision of the Rome Statute. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes New York case law on dismissals in the furtherance of justice 
and derives three key lessons: (1) the questionable efficacy of requiring 
explanations of reasoning; (2) the potential counter-productiveness of 
ambiguous criteria; and (3) the detrimental impact of a lack of consensus 
regarding the purpose of prosecution and punishment.  
This article concludes that the potential for contradictory or seemingly 
arbitrary outcomes based on vague and contested criteria may outweigh 
the benefits of more detailed factors regarding the “interests of justice.” At 
the very least, the New York experience offers cautionary lessons that 
should be taken into account before the ICC Prosecutor adopts further 
criteria regarding the “interests of justice.” Finally, the article offers 
suggestions on minimizing the risks should the push for the adoption of 
guidelines prevail.  
I. INTERESTS OF JUSTICE UNDER THE ROME STATUTE 
The Rome Statute establishing the ICC entered into force in 2002. As 
of January 2013, the ICC has 121 State Parties.
8
 Under the statute, the 
Prosecutor is invested with the authority to determine whether 
investigation or prosecution is warranted.
9
 The Prosecutor may open an 
 
 
 8. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ 
menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, arts. 15, 16, 53–54. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/1
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investigation propio motu with Pre-Trial Chamber approval or based on a 
referral from a State Party or the Security Council.
10
  
Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC when they are committed on the territory of, or by a 
citizen of, a State Party or a State that accepts jurisdiction.
11
 For a referral 
from the Security Council, there are no limits to the jurisdiction of the ICC 
based on territory or nationality.
12
 A case is inadmissible if it lacks 
sufficient gravity or is being investigated, prosecuted, or has been 
investigated or prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction, “unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”13  
The “interests of justice” provision is open-ended and gives the 
Prosecutor the most leeway to initiate, or decline to initiate, an 
investigation or prosecution.
14
 Article 53 governs the initial investigation 
and prosecution stages. With regard to the initiation of an investigation, 
the Prosecutor shall go forward unless there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed.
15
 The Prosecutor is instructed to consider whether: (a) there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the court 
exists; (b) the case is admissible under Article 17; and (c) “[t]aking into 
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice.”16 
Article 53 also allows the Prosecutor to decline to prosecute, even if 
there are sufficient grounds to seek an arrest warrant or summons for the 
accused in an admissible case.
17
 Here, the statute provides that the 
Prosecutor can conclude that there is an insufficient basis for prosecution 
because “[a] prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the 
 
 
 10. Id. arts. 13–15.  
 11. Id. arts. 5, 12. 
 12. Id. arts. 5, 12–13. Jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is not yet operational, pending 
adoption of amendments to the statute defining aggression and related jurisdictional issues. The 
amendments cannot come into force until 2017 at the earliest. 2010 Review Conference: The Crime of 
Aggression, at 19–20, RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_ 
docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
 13. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 17(1). 
 14. See, e.g., James A. Goldston, More Candour About Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 383, 392–93 (2010) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘interests of justice’ . . . is elastic. It provides the Prosecutor a great deal of latitude . . . .”). 
 15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53. 
 16. Id. art. 53(1)(a)–(c).  
 17. Id. art. 53(2). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and 
his or her role in the alleged crime.”18  
The ambiguity of these provisions has led to criticism of the ICC. 
Specifically, the ICC has come under fire for its selection of situations and 
cases, with the Prosecutor often being the primary target. The Prosecutor 
has been criticized for focusing solely on African situations (all of the 
situations and cases to date come from the African continent), for bringing 
one-sided prosecutions (against rebel groups but not the government, for 
example, in Uganda), for bringing charges against both sides (in the 
situation in Darfur, for seeking an arrest warrant against President al-
Bashir and for rebel leaders allegedly responsible for a relatively small 
attack against peacekeepers), and for not bringing charges in certain 
situations (for example, Iraq) or against certain States (for example, 
Western powers such as the United States or Britain).
19
 In terms of the 
“interests of justice” provisions, critics have argued that the Prosecutor 
should not have proceeded with arrest warrants that might undermine 
peace processes in Northern Uganda and Sudan.
20
 Rather, the Prosecutor 
should have declined to investigate or prosecute in the interests of justice 
under Article 53.
21
 The chorus of criticism threatens the credibility of the 
ICC, leading commentators to propose mechanisms to operationalize 
prosecutorial discretion.  
II. DEBATE OVER GUIDELINES FOR ICC PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Many commentators have suggested sound procedures, particularly 
guidelines, as a solution to the ICC’s legitimacy problem,22 especially 
 
 
 18. Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
 19. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 271–74 (2012) (illustrating several criticisms 
of prosecutorial discretion as a threat to the legitimacy of the ICC). 
 20. See, e.g., Aminta Ossom, An African Solution to an African Problem? How an African 
Prosecutor Could Strengthen the ICC, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 68, 73–74 (2011). 
 21. Michael Kourabas, Note, A Vienna Convention Interpretation of the “Interests of Justice” 
Provision of the Rome Statute, the Legality of Domestic Amnesty Agreements, & the Situation in 
Northern Uganda: A “great qualitative step forward,” or a normative retreat?, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 59, 68–69 (2007). 
 22. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KEITH HALL, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTORIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS, EXPERT 
CONSULTATION PROCESS ON GENERAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
11–12 (Mar. 28, 2003), available at http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/hall 
.pdf (urging adoption and publication of prosecutorial guidelines to manage public expectations and 
aid judicial review of decisions not to investigate); Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162, 168 (2005) 
(arguing it is “essential to know which criteria were used in decisions taken by prosecutors in order to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/1
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when it comes to prosecutorial discretion related to the selection process.
23
 
Mireille Delmas-Marty, for example, recently asserted “‘the interests of 
justice’ standard in Article 53 must be defined by explicit criteria.”24 
Others argue that a process that increases transparency may undermine 
legitimacy if it is implemented inconsistently or if it is based on incoherent 
goals of international criminal justice.
25
 
As part of the early expert consultation process for the Prosecutor, in 
2003, Avril McDonald and Roelof Haveman examined prosecutorial 
discretion and argued for the adoption of guidelines and criteria.
26
 They 
noted the “need for ‘objectifying’ or pinning down the largely subjective 
criteria articulated in Article 53(1)” regarding initiation of investigations.27 
They also contended that establishing criteria for prosecutorial discretion 
decisions is crucial for several reasons, including “[t]o avoid fuelling any 
already existing perceptions of the ICC as a political court, to minimize 
any accusations of bias, and to increase transparency and boost the 
 
 
evaluate their legitimacy and legality”); Brian D. Lepard, How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise 
His or Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 533 
(2010) (arguing for ethics-based standards); Rod Rastan, Comment on Victor's Justice & Viability of 
Ex Ante Standards, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 569 (2010) (agreeing with Lepard regarding need for 
selection criteria and method). 
 23. See, e.g., JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 411–12 (2008) (noting that 
while the Rome Statute does not require the Prosecutor to offer public explanations, doing so might 
offer a sound approach to increase legitimacy and credibility); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Interactions 
Between National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 2 (2006) (arguing that the ICC must explain its criteria and methodology better, and 
advocating that decisions to investigate be based on a legitimacy/effectiveness axis while decisions to 
prosecute be based on an universal/relativism axis); Goldston, supra note 14, at 403–04 (discussing 
potential benefits of ICC prosecutorial guidelines provided that they are adopted by the Prosecutor and 
aimed at increasing public understanding of the court rather than determining case-specific decisions); 
Geert Jan Alexander Knoops, Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary International 
Criminal Proceedings: Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a Legal, Ethical and 
Political Perspective, 15 CRIM. L. F. 365, 388–89 (2004) (advocating focus on prosecutorial guidelines 
and criteria, drawn from international criminal tribunals or domestic prosecutorial guidelines). 
 24. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Internationalization of Law: Diversity, Perplexity, Complexity, 
Prepared Text of Remarks at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 29, 
2012), in INTLAWGRRLS, Mar. 30, 2012, http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/03/internationalization-of-
law-diversity.html. 
 25. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 19, at 289–91 (“[A]dherence to principles of good decision 
making cannot enhance [the ICC’s] legitimacy in the absence of agreed goals and priorities for ICC 
action. . . . Moreover, transparency may actually exacerbate perceptions of illegitimacy by exposing 
the incoherence underlying selection decisions.”). 
 26. AVRIL MCDONALD & ROELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION—SOME THOUGHTS 
ON “OBJECTIFYING” THE EXERCISE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE 
ICC, EXPERT CONSULTATION PROCESS ON GENERAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE ICC OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 3 (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/McDonald-Have 
man_issues_relevant.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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credibility of the Court as a strictly judicial institution. . . .”28 McDonald 
and Haveman pointed out the many questions left unanswered by the 
inclusion of the subjective and vague “interests of justice” phrase in the 
Rome Statute.
29
 They concluded, “Article 53 sets out some criteria, but it 
begs more questions than it answers.”30 As a result, McDonald and 
Haveman advocated that guidelines be developed and made public.
31
 
The Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) did subsequently adopt some 
regulations and policies that relate to prosecutorial discretion, but they do 
not fully satisfy commentators or critics.
32
 In part, this stems from a 
deliberate decision by the OTP to refrain from adopting concrete criteria.
33
 
When it comes to interpreting the “interests of justice,” the OTP 
Regulations simply echo the Rome Statute.
34
 While the draft regulations
35
 
and expert proposals
36
 suggested additional “interests of justice” factors, 
the OTP chose not to codify such criteria in the regulations adopted in 
April 2009. 
The more recent 2010 OTP Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations
37
 reiterates the exceptional quality of decisions not to 
proceed in the interests of justice; for further detail, it refers to the 2007 
OTP Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (“2007 OTP Policy Paper”).38 
The 2007 OTP Policy Paper “deliberately [did] not enter into detailed 
discussions about all of the possible factors that may arise in any given 
situation.”39 The 2007 OTP Policy Paper notes that the Rome Statute does 
not attempt to include all relevant specific factors and considers the OTP 
“bound to offer only limited clarification in the abstract,”40 and 
accordingly, it lays out only abstract principles. 
 
 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 5–9.  
 30. Id. at 9. 
 31. Id.  
 32. See, e.g., Mireille Delmas-Marty, supra note 24. 
 33. See generally ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-40B5-9CDA-792BCBE1E 
695/280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See ICC, Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Version 3 (June 2003), available 
at http://www.jura.uni-muenchen.de/fakultaet/lehrstuehle/satzger/materialien/istghdrre.pdf. 
 36. See MCDONALD & HAVEMAN, supra note 26. 
 37. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, Draft, INT’L CRIM. CT. 
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9FF1EAA1-41C4-4A30-A202-174B18 
DA923C/282515/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Policy 
Paper]. 
 38. 2007 Policy Paper, supra note 5. 
 39. Id. at 1. 
 40. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/1
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The first principle is the exceptional nature of the interests of justice 
and the presumption in favor of investigation or prosecution.
41
 The second 
principle emphasizes that the interests of justice should be interpreted via 
the object and purpose of the statute, specifically, the prevention of 
impunity.
42
 The third principle provides that the interests of justice might 
take into account some aspects of peace, but it is not the same as the 
interests of peace, which falls under the mandate of the Security Council.
43
 
The 2007 OTP Policy Paper does not provide concrete criteria for the 
interests of justice beyond the provisions of the statute. Rather, the paper 
stresses that the interests of justice concept is “one of the most complex 
aspects of the Treaty.”44 It does elaborate on the factors that the interests 
of justice may be weighed against per Article 53(1)(c) and/or Article 
53(2)(c).
45
  
First, when determining the gravity of the crime under Articles 53(1)(c) 
and 53(2)(c), the Prosecutor considers the scale, nature, manner of 
commission, and impact of crimes.
46
 Second, regarding the interests of 
victims, the 2007 OTP Policy Paper notes that these interests can be very 
complicated and require the Prosecutor to respect all views, for or against 
prosecution.
47
  
As for the “particular circumstance of the accused” to be considered in 
conjunction with the interests of justice under Article 53(2)(c), the 
Prosecutor must consider the role of the accused in the crime as well as the 
age or infirmity of the accused.
48
 The role of the accused in the crime 
includes both the significance of the accused in the “overall commission of 
crimes and the degree of the accused’s involvement” in particularly 
serious or notorious crimes.
49
 Age or infirmity of the accused might 
preclude prosecution even for those most responsible if the accused is 
terminally ill or was subjected to serious human rights violations.
50
  
Finally, the 2007 OTP Policy Paper indicates that while other justice 
mechanisms and peace considerations may be relevant in some 
circumstances, they should play a complementary role.
51
 Peace processes 
 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 2. 
 45. Id. at 4–7. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 6. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 7–8. 
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might be relevant to the “interests of justice” as broadly defined, but the 
object and purpose of the statute limit the scope of relevant peace and 
security issues.
52
 The paper’s discussion, therefore, fleshes out general 
principles to a degree, but it falls short of adopting additional criteria for 
the interests of justice. 
The 2007 OTP Policy Paper refers to the practice of the OTP as the 
best guidance on interests of justice issues. For example, the OTP has not 
declined to investigate or prosecute in the interests of justice, considering 
that none of the situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
or Darfur satisfy the exceptional circumstances necessary to overcome the 
presumption in favor of going forward.
53
 Because the record of the OTP is 
limited, an examination of a much larger body of determinations regarding 
the interests of justice may be helpful.
54
 
Outside of the OTP and its experts, there have been long-standing calls 
for guidelines, and some commentators have proposed various criteria. For 
example, Allison Marston Danner “argue[s] that prosecutorial decisions 
would be both actually legitimate and perceived as such if they are taken 
in a principled, reasoned, and impartial manner.”55 Danner contends that 
ex ante standards should be adopted to minimize arbitrariness in 
discretionary decision-making.
56
 She suggests that the Prosecutor should 
describe additional factors he or she intends to consider,
57
 and she 
contends that “[a] prime goal of the prosecutorial guidelines should be to 
give content to this nebulous [‘interests of justice’] phrase.”58  
Danner raises several issues that could fall within “interests of justice” 
determinations, including whether the Prosecutor should consider: (1) the 
impact of prosecutions on the area of the crimes; (2) alternative dispute 
resolutions; (3) the risk of destabilization of political situations; 
(4) ongoing conflict; and (5) expense or length of trial.
59
 Regardless of the 
exact contours of the Prosecutor’s guidelines, Danner believes that the 
Prosecutor must make these guidelines public to ensure compliance and 
enhance the legitimacy of the Prosecutor’s decision-making.60 In response 
to the concern that the guidelines will be so general that they will be 
 
 
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Id. at 2–4, 9. 
 54. See discussion infra Part III. 
 55. deGuzman, supra note 19, at 290. 
 56. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 538 (2003). 
 57. Id. at 542.  
 58. Id. at 543. 
 59. Id. at 544. 
 60. Id. at 546–47. 
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rendered meaningless, Danner states that the Prosecutor must “strike a 
balance between enough specificity to constrain and sufficient flexibility 
to allow for future learning and developments.”61 
Similarly, “structured discretion,” including ex ante criteria for the 
interests of justice, would strengthen the credibility of the ICC, according 
to Philippa Webb.
62
 In her article, Webb notes that the Rome Statute does 
not indicate how much weight to give to the enumerated interests of 
justice factors, which do not comprise an exhaustive list.
63
 Webb proposes 
that the Prosecutor consider international peace and security, transitional 
justice, and resources as well as general principles (non-discrimination, 
deterrence, integrity).
64
 Under Webb’s theory, the Prosecutor should make 
such criteria public, give reasons for decisions, and ensure consistency.
65
 
James Goldston agrees in part, stating that “it is perhaps time” for the 
Prosecutor to set up guidelines.
66
 Goldston notes that “[s]uch guidelines 
are common in domestic systems” and would be even “more warranted 
where, as in the case of the ICC, the jurisprudence concerning the crimes 
at issue is still relatively undeveloped, the impact of prosecutorial 
decisions on affected societies is potentially vast, and there is little directly 
analogous precedent upon which the Prosecutor may rely in reaching 
charging decisions.”67 Yet Goldston is skeptical of the benefits of 
guidelines, as their implementation in complex, varied situations may not 
yield accountability to the extent expected.
68
 Nonetheless, he concludes 
that the adoption of prosecutorial guidelines might create greater 
understanding of the difficult charging decisions made and the 
complicated mix of factors and considerations involved.
69
 
Alexander Greenawalt agrees that ex ante guidelines may sometimes 
be useful for legitimacy, but he argues that much more is required to 
navigate the tension between prosecutorial independence and the 
challenges of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute.
70
 
Greenawalt examines prosecutorial discretion as a reflection of the 
 
 
 61. Id. at 550. 
 62. Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not to Proceed in the “Interests of 
Justice,” 50 CRIM. L. Q. 305, 306 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 326. 
 64. Id. at 338–44. 
 65. Id. at 345. 
 66. Goldston, supra note 14, at 403.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 403–04. 
 69. Id. at 405–06. 
 70. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 587–88 (2007). 
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structure of the ICC and proposes a “pragmatic model of prosecutorial 
discretion.”71 He focuses, in particular, on the “dilemmas of discretion” 
faced by the Prosecutor, including the issues of amnesty, selective 
prosecution or charging (choices to prosecute certain players to a conflict 
and choices to target certain crimes), the expansive nature of the crimes 
defined in the Rome Statute, and the timing of indictments.
72
 As a result, 
the controversies over prosecutorial discretion stem not merely from the 
lack of sufficient guidance in the statute, but also from the nature of the 
issues at hand. Greenawalt states: “Guidelines developed to demonstrate 
the objectivity of prosecutorial choices are of little assistance if the 
problems are not of the sort themselves that can be effectively subjected to 
rule-based decisionmaking.”73 
Greenawalt criticizes Danner and others for failing to offer specific 
guidance regarding difficult questions such as deference to amnesties or 
truth commissions.
74
 He notes that Danner’s call for the Prosecutor to treat 
all cases similarly might undermine the Prosecutor’s ability to adapt to 
various contexts posed by different transitional societies.
75
 He also fears 
that guidelines might be counter-productive: 
The kind of guidelines that provide for meaningful ex ante 
decisional rules likely to demonstrate the ICC Prosecutor’s 
impartiality may not be the kind likely to embrace the full 
complexity and contingency of each situation. The Prosecutor may 
therefore be stuck between the Scylla of ossified ex ante decisional 
rules that promote certainty at the risk of substantive inadequacy 
and the Charybdis of open-ended criteria that leave great flexibility 
for individual circumstances but risk that the Prosecutor’s discretion 
may be no more guided than if those criteria did not exist in the first 
place.
76
  
As noted above, Danner recognizes that there should be some 
flexibility built into the guidelines, but she leaves it to the Prosecutor to 
fully resolve how to achieve balance between constraint and flexibility. 
Greenawalt himself does not offer concrete guidelines. Instead, he would 
shift the focus to the ability of the Prosecutor to develop policies that meet 
 
 
 71. Id. at 588. 
 72. Id. at 612–50. 
 73. Id. at 654. 
 74. Id. at 586. 
 75. Id. at 654–55 (referring to expert advice regarding the interests of justice offered to the ICC 
by McDonald and Haveman in addition to Danner). 
 76. Id. at 656. 
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the legitimacy challenges of exercising prosecutorial discretion in the 
midst of complex political situations.
77
 He proposes explicit or 
constructive deference to political actors, such as the Security Council or 
regional bodies, when dealing with transitional regimes, rather than 
suggesting guidelines for discretion.
78
 
In the face of uncertainty over the goals of the ICC, Margaret M. 
deGuzman is also skeptical of the efficacy of ICC prosecutorial guidelines. 
In her article, deGuzman reviews the literature calling for procedural 
solutions to enhance independence, impartiality, objectivity, and 
transparency.
79
 She argues that principled decision-making based on good 
process is impossible without agreement on underlying principles, 
something that is lacking in the current ICC system.
80
 She agrees with 
Greenawalt that some decisions may be ill-suited to the adoption of 
objectively applied ex ante criteria.
81
 For example, deGuzman notes that 
increased transparency through the use of ex ante guidelines may 
“exacerbate perceptions of illegitimacy by exposing the incoherence 
underlying selection decisions.”82 Because the ICC and the international 
community have yet to coalesce around a common goal or priority, 
deGuzman asserts that “articulating ‘criteria’ or ‘guidelines’ for selections 
may simply highlight the inconsistent manner in which such decisions are 
made.”83 Further, deGuzman finds lacking the typical theories behind the 
exercise of discretion in selecting situations and cases—namely, 
retribution, deterrence, and restorative justice.
84
 She concludes that an 
expressive theory is the most promising for creating consensus around an 
underlying principle that then gives rise to specific norms and priorities.
85
 
In other words, the project of formulating prosecutorial guidelines cannot 
begin until the ICC and the international community agree on the goals 
that these guidelines are supposed to advance. 
 
 
 77. Id. at 671–73. 
 78. Id. at 660–71. 
 79. deGuzman, supra note 19, pt. II. 
 80. Id. at 290. deGuzman notes that Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo did heed calls from Danner and 
others to some extent, as he circulated draft policy papers discussing selection criteria. Id. at 298. 
These papers, in pertinent part, are discussed above. See 2010 Policy Paper, supra note 37; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 37–55. 
 81. deGuzman, supra note 19, at 292. 
 82. Id. at 291. 
 83. Id. at 298. 
 84. Id. at 301–11. 
 85. Id. at 312–13. 
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The “malleability of the factor-based approach”86 to the interests of 
justice may actually undermine efforts to increase the legitimacy of the 
ICC. If the Prosecutor claims to follow strict ex ante standards that then 
give rise to inconsistent outcomes, the reliance on those standards seems 
“disingenuous” rather than impartial.87 Margaret deGuzman concludes that 
“by purporting to follow unchanging criteria rather than admitting the 
policy choices he faces, the Prosecutor may actually detract from the 
Court’s legitimacy, strengthening accusations of improper political 
influence and even ‘victor’s justice.’”88 
In sum, commentators and experts have frequently called for the OTP 
to promulgate prosecutorial guidelines and specific, detailed criteria. 
Commentators have also, however, voiced skepticism over the benefits of 
such guidelines and concerns that ex ante standards might backfire. The 
debate over the adoption and content of prosecutorial guidelines would 
benefit from an examination of another system’s experience with similar 
provisions. This article will narrow its focus to one controversial aspect of 
prosecutorial discretion: the interests of justice provision, specifically, 
declinations to prosecute under Article 53(2)(c). An examination of New 
York law on dismissals in furtherance of justice can shed light on whether 
detailed criteria will increase the legitimacy of the ICC by providing 
guidelines for choices that may otherwise appear biased, or undermine it 
by revealing apparent inconsistency or even incoherency in interpreting 
and applying the criteria. 
Other commentators propose specific interpretations of the “interests of 
justice” based on domestic law. For example, Chris Gallavin compares the 
“interests of justice” provision to the “public interest” provision under the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors of England and Wales; he proposes a revised 
Article 53 that would allow the Prosecutor more leeway to consider the 
political impact of prosecution.
89
 J. Alex Little examines U.S. domestic 
violence prosecution policies for lessons on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion that prioritizes prosecution over victim autonomy.
90
 He 
concludes that prosecutions should go forward “even if the potential cost 
to victims is significant, arguing that the balance between accountability 
 
 
 86. Id. at 296.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Chris Gallavin, Article 53 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the 
Interests of Justice?, 14 KING’S C. L. J. 179, 179–80 (2003). 
 90. J. Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal 
Court, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363 (2007). 
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and victim autonomy at this point in the Court’s history should favor 
accountability.”91  
Rather than looking to domestic prosecutorial guidelines, this article 
will draw on New York case law implementing the statute that allows for 
dismissals of criminal charges in furtherance of justice. It does not draw 
on domestic law to propose new guidelines for prosecutorial discretion 
under the ICC. Instead, this article’s examination utilizes the experience of 
a domestic criminal jurisdiction to analyze the benefits and risks of 
operationalizing more detailed criteria on the interests of justice. 
III. LESSONS FROM NEW YORK DISMISSALS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 
Many jurisdictions in the United States have provisions that allow for 
dismissals of criminal proceedings in furtherance of, or in the interest of, 
justice.
92
 New York is one of the only jurisdictions to introduce and codify 
specific factors to be considered.
93
 These factors appear in Section 210.40 
of New York Criminal Procedure Law (“section 210.40”).94 According to 
one commentator, the existence of statutory criteria in New York has 
produced better-supported decisions than other, less “logical” state 
statutes.
95
 Commentators have pointed to the New York statute as a model 
for dismissals in furtherance of justice.
96
 After first outlining the New 
York statute, this Part illustrates the relevance of the New York analogue 
to the ICC despite differences between the two systems. It then examines 
the similarities between “interests of justice” factors in both systems. 
Finally, it analyzes New York case law and explains the implications of 
the New York experience for the ICC.  
A. New York Statutory Criteria 
New York common law provided loose criteria for interests of justice 
dismissals prior to the adoption of the section 210.40(1) factors,
97
 but in 
 
 
 91. Id. at 367. 
 92. See Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further Is the Furtherance of Justice?, 
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413 (1991). 
 93. See id. at 422–23. 
 94. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2011). Section 210.40 covers felonies. The 
parallel statute for dismissing misdemeanors is Section 170.40. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 
(McKinney 2011). 
 95. Kles, supra note 92, at 468. 
 96. Id. at 472; John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York’s “Interests of Justice” 
Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 222 (1994). 
 97. See, e.g., People v. Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108–09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
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1979, the legislature adopted specific criteria.
98
 The statutory amendment 
adding the factors was in direct response to the opinion in People v. Belge 
by New York’s highest court.99 In Belge, the court expressed concern that 
there were no “criteria for the responsible exercise” of interests of justice 
discretion, and the legislature responded.
100
 
Sounding similar to commentators who urge the ICC Prosecutor to 
adopt criteria for greater legitimacy, judges in New York describe the 
criteria as beneficial. For example, one trial court judge favorably cited the 
Supplementary Practice Commentary for section 210.40, explaining that 
the additional ten factors guard against arbitrary decisions.
101
 The factors 
compel judges to “consider and articulate real reasons” in granting 
motions to dismiss in furtherance of justice.
102
  
Under section 210.40, dismissal of proceedings in the furtherance of 
justice is a vehicle to end a prosecution when: 
such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the 
existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance 
clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the 
defendant upon such indictment or count would constitute or result 
in injustice.
103
 
The statute further provides:  
In determining whether such compelling factor, consideration, or 
circumstance exists, the court must, to the extent applicable, 
examine and consider, individually and collectively, the following: 
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; 
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; 
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; 
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; 
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement 
personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the 
defendant; 
 
 
 98. See People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1983) (referring to 1979 Amendments as direct 
response to the court’s concerns). 
 99. See People v. Belge, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam). 
 100. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d at 420 (citing People v. Belge, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976)). 
 101. People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (N.Y. Jus. Ct. 1980). 
 102. Id. 
 103. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1) (McKinney 2011). 
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(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a 
sentence authorized for the offense; 
(g) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in 
the criminal justice system; 
(h) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the 
community; 
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the 
complainant or victim with respect to the motion; 
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction 
would serve no useful purpose.
104
 
B. The New York Statute’s Relevance to the ICC’s “Interests of Justice” 
Provision 
Despite differences between the New York and ICC “interests of 
justice” provisions and their implementation, there are key similarities that 
would allow the ICC to draw from the experience of New York. Concerns 
regarding transparency of decision-making, perceived legitimacy, and the 
theoretical underpinnings of prosecution and punishment are common to 
both systems. Prior to discussing these concerns and the concomitant 
lessons learned from New York case law, this section will explore both 
systems’ approaches to the “interests of justice” and the basis for drawing 
from New York jurisprudence to predict possible benefits and risks of 
adopting enhanced criteria at the ICC.  
Under New York law, the prosecution, defense, or the court sua sponte 
may move to dismiss an indictment “in furtherance of justice,” a phrase 
used interchangeably with “in the interest of justice.”105 While the defense 
and/or prosecution may put forth arguments regarding the interests of 
justice, only the court is required to set forth its reasons for dismissing an 
indictment in the interest of justice.
106
 By contrast, under the Rome 
Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) can evaluate the equivalent of a 
suspension in the furtherance of justice only if the Prosecutor has declined 
to go forward with the prosecution based on Article 53(2)(c).
107
 Despite 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. “An order dismissing an indictment in the interest of justice may be issued upon motion of 
the people or of the court itself as well as upon that of the defendant.” Id. § 210.40(3) (emphasis 
added). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53(3). 
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these differences, the experience of New York can yield lessons for the 
ICC on how it might implement additional criteria for the Rome Statute’s 
interests of justice provision.  
First, the motivation behind the “interests of justice” criteria is similar 
under the two systems. New York adopted criteria to curb the discretion of 
the courts because of concerns that courts were arbitrarily granting 
dismissals.
108
 The adoption of the section 210.40(1) factors was, therefore, 
aimed at channeling discretion and requiring judges to justify their 
decisions.
109
 Similarly, proponents of adopting ICC ex ante standards 
advocate that such standards will enhance the legitimacy of the 
Prosecutor’s determinations.110 Thus, despite the difference in location of 
discretion, the guidelines and motivation for “interests of justice” 
discretion are similar in New York and under the ICC. 
Second, in both New York and under the ICC, the “interests of justice” 
provision is intended to be used sparingly and only in exceptional 
circumstances. Boilerplate language in New York cases states that section 
210.40 discretion “should be ‘exercised sparingly’ and only in that ‘rare’ 
and ‘unusual’ case where it ‘cries out for fundamental justice beyond the 
confines of conventional considerations.’”111 Similarly, the ICC Prosecutor 
has repeatedly stated that the decision not to proceed in the interests of 
justice should be “highly exceptional.”112 
Third, although New York law is couched in terms of the rights of the 
defendant—whether the prosecution of the accused would result in 
injustice—courts interpret it much more broadly. The New York statute 
requires consideration of factors related to the victim, the community, and 
the public at large.
113
 When interpreting “the interests of justice” under 
section 210.40(1), New York courts consider whether justice, broadly 
conceived, would be served by prosecution of the accused.
114
 While the 
Prosecutor at the international level will be working on an even larger 
scale, the New York criteria encompass the interests of justice beyond the 
individual defendant.  
Fourth, the ICC Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a specific case 
in the interests of justice falls at an earlier stage than the New York 
 
 
 108. People v. Joseph P., 433 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (N.Y. Jus. Ct. 1980). 
 109. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 110. See discussion supra Part II. 
 111. People v. Caster, 927 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 112. 2010 Policy Paper, supra note 37, ¶ 75. 
 113. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1). 
 114. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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decision. The New York statute applies to crimes already charged,
115
 while 
the ICC “interests of justice” provision under discussion (Article 53(2)) 
relates to a decision not to bring charges.
116
 These differences are not as 
great as they might initially appear. Given the extensive steps needed to 
investigate crimes of the magnitude that the ICC Prosecutor faces, it is 
likely that by the time of identifying potential suspects and determining 
whether to prosecute, the Prosecutor’s decision will be based on 
substantial information. Moreover, Article 53(2)(c) requires the ICC 
Prosecutor to consider all the circumstances related to prosecution before 
making a determination on the interests of justice.
117
 
Furthermore, the difference in the number of players involved in the 
decision-making process between the two systems is not as significant 
when the broader participation of civil society at the international level is 
taken into account. There are fewer decision-makers at the ICC than in 
New York, but the audience of self-perceived stakeholders is broader. 
Unlike the multi-layered court system in New York,
118
 the ICC decision-
maker is often only one entity—the Prosecutor—and less frequently the 
PTC and Appeals Chamber (“AC”).119 Yet the scrutiny of the ICC 
decisions by the international community widens the pool of potential 
players offering assessments of the situation. In particular, NGOs crucial 
to the creation and development of the ICC, as well as academics, believe 
that they have a stake in the legitimacy of the Court.
120
 In addition, 
victims’ representatives and civil society more broadly may also be 
engaged with the ICC in a way not applicable in New York criminal cases. 
As a result, the concern with the interpretation of criteria at the ICC is not 
merely that incoming and outgoing prosecutors, or the Prosecutor and the 
judiciary, may diverge on the proper interpretation of “interests of justice” 
criteria. It is also that credible NGOs, academics, and perhaps even 
representatives of State Parties or UN members will put forth their own 
analyses based on the expanded criteria. When these analyses conflict with 
that of the Prosecutor, it may call into question the legitimacy of the ICC 
 
 
 115. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1). 
 116. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53(2). 
 117. Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
 118. While there are occasional commentators in New York, the main players are confined to the 
judiciary. Thus, an examination of the implementation of the criteria by the New York courts will be 
the main focus of this analysis. 
 119. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53(2)–(3). 
 120. See discussion infra III.D (highlighting criticism of academics). Many NGOs are invested in 
the ICC. See, e.g., About the Coalition, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., www.iccnow.org/?mod 
=coalition (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (consisting of 2500 civil society organizations in 150 countries 
working to support and strengthen the ICC).  
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in the same way that judicial disagreements among courts may undermine 
the perceived legitimacy of the New York adjudication process.  
Moreover, this danger is exacerbated at the ICC. The ICC, as a new 
institution, may be undermined by apparently arbitrary or confusing 
implementation of nebulous criteria like proposed “interests of justice” 
factors because it has yet to fully establish its credibility. The ICC is also 
subject to greater scrutiny than New York courts. Thus, there are parallels 
between differences of opinion among numerous New York courts and a 
variety of stakeholders at the ICC. 
Finally, the New York “interests of justice” determination takes place 
in an adversarial context, unlike at the ICC. Under the Rome Statute, there 
is no provision for motions of the parties regarding dismissal in the 
“interests of justice.”121 In addition, the PTC does not review decisions of 
the Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of a case, regardless of 
claims from interested entities that it might not be in the interests of justice 
to do so.
122
 Defendants who believe that a prosecution is not in the 
interests of justice have no recourse under Article 53.
123
 There is no formal 
mechanism for argument from the defendants, victims, or members of the 
international community.
124
 As a result, it would appear even more crucial 
to have the Prosecutor lay out his or her reasoning to gain the confidence 
of the public in his or her decisions, and in the legitimacy of the ICC more 
broadly. But the New York experience, using similar but more detailed 
factors than those in Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, suggests that 
enhanced criteria do not necessarily yield gains in transparency or 
legitimacy. 
C. Comparison of “Interests of Justice” Factors 
The New York law provides a large body of “interests of justice” 
determinations, which can yield lessons for the ICC.
125
 Although the 
criminal context differs from the types of ongoing conflicts typically faced 
by the ICC, the factors utilized by the New York courts sufficiently 
parallel the Rome Statute’s provisions. In both scenarios, the decision-
maker is called upon to decide what “justice” requires. Moreover, the 
 
 
 121. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53. 
 122. Id. art. 53(3). 
 123. Id. art. 53. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Cf. Little, supra note 90, at 388 (using extensive American experience regarding domestic 
violence to explore questions raised by the Ugandan case at the ICC, despite caveats regarding 
imperfect comparison). 
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enacted and proposed factors are aimed at curbing the discretion of the 
decision-maker (in New York, the courts; under the Rome Statute, 
potentially both the Prosecutor and the judiciary).
126
 Thus, analysis of the 
New York jurisprudence will help determine whether implementation of a 
more extensive list of factors regarding “interests of justice” would likely 
benefit the ICC.  
The section 210.40(1) factors largely parallel the “interests of justice” 
factors of the Rome Statute but are more extensive. The section 210.40(1) 
factors provide guidance as to when the court may dismiss an indictment 
in the interests of justice, based on its own initiative or on motion of the 
defendant or prosecutor.
127
 Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must 
obtain approval of the PTC with regard to declination to prosecute based 
on the interests of justice.
128
 In order to maintain credibility with the ICC’s 
broader class of stakeholders, the Prosecutor must also attain their 
support—if not for the outcome of his or her decisions, then for the 
transparent, reasoned way his or her determinations are reached. Under 
Article 53(2)(c), the Rome Statute provides three factors related to the 
perpetrator: (1) gravity of the crime the perpetrator allegedly committed; 
(2) age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator; and (3) his or her alleged 
role in the crime. Additional enumerated factors include: (4) interests of 
the victims; and (5) all other circumstances.
129
 
The three factors related to the perpetrator under the Rome Statute find 
parallels in the New York factors. First, the gravity of the crime under the 
Rome Statute is related to the seriousness and circumstances of the offence 
under section 210.40(1)(a) and the extent of the harm under section 
210.40(1)(b). Second, the age or infirmity of the perpetrator considered 
under the Rome Statute would be subsumed under section 210.40(1)(d), 
which includes the condition of the defendant. Third, the Rome Statute’s 
consideration of the accused’s role in the crime would fall under several 
section 210.40(1) factors, including (a) and (b) regarding circumstances 
and harm related to the offence respectively, (c) evidence of guilt, and 
(d) history or character of defendant. 
The Rome Statute’s reference to the interests of the victims is more 
complex, reflecting the ambiguity of the term “victims.” It is paralleled 
directly under section 210.40(1)(i) regarding the attitude of the victim, 
though the judge in New York must deem such input appropriate. It may 
 
 
 126. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 127. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40. 
 128. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 53(3). 
 129. Id. art. 53(2)(c). 
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come into play indirectly if “victims” is interpreted to encompass the 
community or public: sections 210.40(1)(g) and 210.40(1)(h) refer to the 
impact of dismissal on public confidence in the criminal justice system 
and on the safety or welfare of the community.  
Finally, the reference under Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, 
authorizing consideration of all circumstances, is similar to the breadth of 
the section 210.40(1) factors. The New York statute contains a catchall 
factor under section 210.40(1)(j), allowing consideration of any other 
relevant fact indicating that conviction would not serve a useful 
purpose.
130
 All other circumstances under the Rome Statute might also 
encompass section 210.40(1)(e), exceptionally serious misconduct of law 
enforcement.
131
 The reference to all the circumstances or an interpretation 
of the term “justice” might also cover section 210.40(1)(f), the purpose 
and effect of sentencing the defendant for the offense. 
Thus, the more detailed factors of the New York statute are similar to 
the current criteria of the Rome Statute, but theoretically provide for 
greater transparency and legitimacy due to their specificity and their 
longer history of use. 
D. Analysis of New York Case Law and Implications for the ICC 
New York courts have issued hundreds of decisions regarding 
dismissals in furtherance of justice, considering (at least in theory) the ten 
statutory factors.
132
 A review of the New York experience will shed light 
on whether the ICC’s legitimacy would be enhanced by more detailed 
factors and public explanations of decisions regarding the interests of 
justice.  
Specifically, an analysis of New York jurisprudence yields three 
lessons: (1) a requirement to provide a written rationale based on 
enumerated factors does not necessarily yield a full or satisfying 
explanation; (2) a full explanation can be counter-productive if it triggers 
controversy over matters of discretion, leading to apparently inconsistent 
results that can undermine legitimacy; and (3) reference to purposes of the 
criminal justice system can lead to more confusion than clarity when there 
 
 
 130. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1)(j). 
 131. See 2007 Policy Paper, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that international justice might not be 
furthered by prosecution of an accused “who has been the subject of abuse amounting to serious 
human rights violations”). 
 132. See discussion infra Parts III.D.1–3. 
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is no agreement on the goals of prosecution and punishment or their 
relative weight. 
1. Efficacy of Requirement of Written Rationale 
Proponents of requiring the ICC Prosecutor to publicly explain his or 
her rationale based on ex ante standards imply that this will inoculate the 
Prosecutor from criticism for lack of transparency.
133
 Yet the New York 
jurisprudence shows that even a statutory requirement does not ensure a 
thorough, let alone convincing, explanation of reasoning. For every case 
where the court provides a clear explanation with reference to the ten 
statutory factors, there are several where the court does little more than 
recite boilerplate language about the statute.  
The New York statute provides that the court must “set forth its 
reasons” for granting a motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice.134 New 
York courts have interpreted this to mean that, while the court should 
provide its reasoning, it need not engage in a “catechistic on-the-record 
discussion of items (a) through (j),” though a basis in at least one factor 
should be discernible.
135
 Because the New York statute does not explicitly 
require an explanation for a denial, many courts deny such motions in a 
sentence or two, using boilerplate language.
136
 In other cases, the court 
does not even include the boilerplate language before denying the 
motion.
137
 Similarly, appellate courts in New York at times affirm or 
reverse the trial court’s dismissal with little explanation.138 For instance, 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s 
dismissal of drug charges without any discussion of the statutory factors or 
the lower court’s reasoning; it cited several cases in stating, “Upon 
consideration of the circumstances of this case and the factors set forth in 
CPL 210.40(1), we conclude that there is no compelling factor which 
 
 
 133. See discussion supra Part II notes 26–31, 56–65. 
 134. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(3). 
 135. People v. Norman, 789 N.Y.S.2d 613, 645 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2004) (citations omitted). It should 
be noted that “supreme court” in New York designates a trial court. 
 136. For example, in a recent case, the trial court quoted the boilerplate language regarding 
section 210.40, then stated, “[h]aving reviewed the Grand Jury minutes and the motion papers, the 
Court concludes that this case does not present one of those rare instances in which dismissal in 
furtherance of justice is warranted.” People v. Caster, 927 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2011) 
(citations omitted). 
 137. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 851 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (one-sentence 
conclusion rejecting case as rare instance where dismissal is warranted). 
 138. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 868 N.Y.S.2d 909, 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (affirming 
dismissal in one short paragraph); People v. M.R., 841 N.Y.S.2d 799, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(affirming denial of dismissal). 
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warrants dismissal of the indictment in furtherance of justice.”139 In 
addition, appellate courts affirm dismissals without any rationale or with a 
simple reference to the lower court’s reasoning, which can be particularly 
problematic when lower court opinions are difficult to find.
140
 
While these decisions might be supportable on the merits and may not 
per se violate the statutory requirement of giving reasons for granting 
dismissals, they arguably violate the spirit of the statute by not giving 
lower courts or the public any guidance or reassurance that the decisions 
are not arbitrary. Such conclusory reasoning would obviously not increase 
transparency or augment the legitimacy of the ICC. If this is the result 
when the statute encourages articulation of the decision-maker’s rationale, 
there is reason to be wary of the efficacy of ICC prosecutorial guidelines 
that require full explanations. If the Prosecutor (or the Court) were to 
follow New York’s lead in relying on boilerplate language, for instance, 
the legitimacy of the ICC might be undermined, rather than enhanced, by 
what may be perceived as poorly articulated explanations of expanded 
criteria underlying “interests of justice” decisions.  
Given the ICC Prosecutor’s reluctance to date to engage in debate over 
the interests of justice,
141
 it is possible she would be reluctant to provide a 
thorough explanation when applying expanded interests of justice criteria, 
especially if it might limit future discretion. In addition, the first 
Prosecutor’s claim that he applied the law without considering political 
aspects
142
 might have prevented a full implementation of enhanced criteria 
that necessarily entail political determinations. Similarly, the Court has 
often been reluctant to address issues related to prosecutorial discretion, 
particularly prosecutorial inaction,
143
 making it possible that any judicial 
 
 
 139. People v. Candelaria, 855 N.Y.S.2d 259, 259–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 140. See, e.g., Lewis, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (affirming dismissal in four sentences, relying on trial 
court decision with no reference to the facts of the case or specific statutory factors); People v. 
Martinez, 757 N.Y.S.2d 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (same); see also People v. Vecchio, 535 N.Y.S.2d 
537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (one sentence rationale relying on lower court opinion). Thanks to TJSL 
Reference Librarian Catherine Deane for confirming that the lower court opinions in Lewis, Martinez, 
and other cases are not readily available. 
 141. 2007 Policy Paper, supra note 5, at 1. 
 142. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Address at Nuremberg: Building a Future 
on Peace and Justice (June 24–25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466 
EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf (“My duty 
is to apply the law without political considerations.”). As noted above, Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure as 
Prosecutor ended, and Fatou Bensouda’s term began, June 2012. See supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
 143. Carsten Stahn, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, in THE 
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 275 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter 
eds., 2009) (describing cautious stance of judicial review of prosecutorial discretion). 
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review would be similar to the less engaged jurisprudence in New York. 
Accordingly, any ICC standards adopted regarding “interests of justice” 
determinations should not assume that the relevant actors will adhere to 
non-statutory requirements for explanations of reasoning.  
On the other hand, the New York and ICC jurisdictions face crimes 
that are different in magnitude. This difference might impact the tendency 
for conclusory reasoning because one might presume that greater stakes 
will engender greater care in providing explanations. As a result, the 
concerns about the potential for insufficient reasoning might seem 
excessive in the international context. It is nonetheless something to bear 
in mind because, in similar contexts, the ICC has been taken to task for 
insufficient or opaque reasoning. 
For example, the Prosecutor has been criticized for giving superficial 
or unconvincing explanations of decisions not to go forward with an 
investigation, for example, in Iraq. In declining to initiate an investigation 
of alleged war crimes by British nationals in Iraq, the Prosecutor based his 
reasons on gravity; he indicated that the situation was not sufficiently 
grave due to the small number of victims (only 4–12 deaths, less than 20 
victims of inhuman treatment).
144
 According to deGuzman, the Prosecutor 
“conflated” the gravity threshold for admissibility and gravity of the crime 
as a factor for prosecutorial discretion.
145
 More significantly, the 
Prosecutor has been “harshly criticized” for his explanation of his exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion in this context.
146
  
Commentators point to the Prosecutor's “failure to provide clarity and 
detail” when articulating his reasons.147 One commentator argued: 
The problem with the decision not to proceed to investigate the 
situation in Iraq is that the Prosecutor’s statement is especially glib 
given the complexity of the issues raised and the known level of 
violence in Iraq. . . . When the Prosecutor decides not to submit a 
request for authorization to initiate an investigation of a situation 
 
 
 144. Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L. F. 281, 310–
11 (2006). 
 145. Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1400, 1432 (2009); see also Ignaz Stegmiller, Interpretative Gravity under the 
Rome Statute, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY 
TO PRACTICE 611 (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011). 
 146. Stegmiller, supra note 145, at 610 n.40 (citations omitted). 
 147. Murphy, supra note 144, at 311. 
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like that of Iraq to a [PTC] of the Court, it is imperative that he 
outline his reasons in detail.
148
  
Similarly, the Prosecutor has been criticized for his failure to explain 
his conclusion regarding the gravity of the Darfur and DRC situations: 
“One major deficit of the [Office of the Prosecutor’s] early practice is not 
the application of the criterion of gravity as such, but the lack of 
transparency when applying it.”149 The Prosecutor's failure to provide 
convincing reasoning in a case as high-profile as the Iraq situation 
indicates that it is plausible that it might occur again in analogous 
contexts. 
The Prosecutor is not the only entity in the ICC that might fail to 
provide a sufficient explanation of “interests of justice” decisions. The 
judiciary has faced similar criticism as well. For example, the AC was 
chastised by some commentators for overturning a PTC definition of 
gravity under Article 17(1)(d)
150
 without providing sufficient guidance for 
proper interpretation. One commentator noted that although the AC is 
“under no obligation to develop a gravity test,” by failing to do so, “it left 
the Court with a legal vacuum.”151 Any proposals for expanded criteria 
should, therefore, incorporate incentives for increased transparency in 
explanations regarding the interests of justice. 
2. Counter-productiveness of Explanations 
When New York courts do provide detailed analyses of the statutory 
factors to support their conclusions, the reasoning may simply provide 
ammunition for accusations of arbitrariness. Because the factors consist of 
vague criteria that must be weighed against each other according to the 
judgment of the court, reasonable minds may differ on the proper exercise 
of discretion on the facts. This plays out in various ways in New York 
jurisprudence. First, there are appellate court decisions that reverse lower 
court opinions because of apparent philosophical or theoretical 
 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Stegmiller, supra note 145, at 611. 
 150. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d) (providing that a 
case may be inadmissible due to insufficient gravity). 
 151.  Stegmiller, supra note 145, at 616; see also Rod Rastan, Review of ICC Jurisprudence 2008, 
7 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 261, 279 (2008) (commenting that “the absence of a definition of gravity 
in the majority decision means that much is left undecided and remains subject to future litigation,” 
while noting the importance of rejecting the PTC test). 
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disagreements on how to weigh ambiguous criteria.
152
 Second, New York 
courts at the same level disagree about the proper interpretation of criteria, 
particularly the history, character, and condition of the defendant, and 
have been criticized on the grounds that their decisions are unpredictable 
and arbitrary. The experience of New York bears out Greenawalt’s point 
that complex factors weighed against each other do not lend themselves to 
predictability or outcome consistency.
153
 
Transferred to the ICC context, similar disagreements will likely arise 
in the face of successive high-profile situations and intense scrutiny from 
the international community, if not other organs of the ICC. This may play 
out in several ways: (1) disagreements between Prosecutors (a minor issue, 
given the typical nine-year tenure of a prosecutor)
154
; (2) disagreements 
between the Prosecutor and PTC and/or AC; or, most likely, (3) credible 
analyses by outside commentators that reach outcomes different from the 
Prosecutor based on the same enhanced criteria. Any one of these three 
possibilities may decrease legitimacy for the Court given the intense 
scrutiny it is under. This, in turn, could be detrimental due to the Court’s 
need for continued backing by the international community.
155
  
Explanations of reasoning can be counter-productive when appellate 
courts reverse lower court decisions based on theoretical differences over 
interpretations of vague criteria, showing little deference to the trial court. 
For example, in People v. Schellenbach,
156
 there was disagreement over 
the seriousness of the charges and weight accorded to government 
misconduct. The trial court provided an extensive analysis of factors (a)–
(i), with the catchall factor not applicable.
157
 It went on to find that while 
the sexual assault crimes alleged were very serious, the circumstances 
undermined that seriousness where the prosecutor expressed doubt in the 
complainant and initially offered very generous plea bargains.
158
 The 
prosecutor’s actions and statements also called into question the extent of 
harm and evidence of guilt.
159
 The defendant’s prior misdemeanor record 
 
 
 152. One commentator attributed an increase in reversals on the merits (rather than procedural 
error) to the adoption of the factors. See Wirenius, supra note 96, at 205, 222. 
 153. See Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 655. 
 154. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 42(4). 
 155. The lack of an adversarial process does not change this conclusion, as the unpredictability of 
New York cases does not seem to stem from the vagaries of good or poor lawyering. Rather, the 
varying interpretations of amorphous notions like the character of the accused or the seriousness of a 
crime cause much of the unpredictability. See discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
 156. People v. Schellenbach, 862 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2008). 
 157. Id. at 733–738. 
 158. Id. at 733. 
 159. Id. at 734. 
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was not considered significant, particularly as it was not related to sexual 
or violent crime.
160
  
The trial court explained the governmental misconduct in great detail, 
while conceding it did not necessarily reach the “exceptionally serious” 
level compelling dismissal on its own.
161
 The trial court concluded that 
although the purpose of imposing a sentence on a defendant includes 
deterrence, sentencing this defendant would “be a travesty of justice, given 
the facts of this case.”162 Regarding the impact of the dismissal on the 
safety or welfare of the community, the court found no negative impact 
given the questions regarding the defendant’s guilt and the complainant’s 
credibility.
163
 As for the victim’s attitude, the court did not give weight to 
the complainant’s wish to proceed given her history of noncooperation 
with the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s own reservations about 
credibility.
164
 The trial court, therefore, determined that there were 
compelling factors supporting dismissal in the interest of justice.
165
 
The appellate court disagreed. In a much shorter opinion (illustrating 
the lack of a thorough explanation as discussed above), it reversed.
166
 It 
relied on the seriousness of the charges and the lack of “exceptionally 
serious” governmental misconduct.167  
The Schellenbach decisions show how the same facts may give rise to 
two drastically different interpretations of ambiguous criteria like 
“seriousness” of the crime and governmental misconduct. A similar 
dynamic may play out at the ICC when the PTC reviews prosecutorial 
declinations or when commentators dissect the Prosecutor’s rationale. 
Furthermore, explanations of reasoning across decision-makers can 
also do more harm than good if various actors apply the same criteria in 
different ways. New York courts have offered varying interpretations of 
vague criteria, such as the character or condition of the defendant. 
For example, drug cases in New York dealing with the “character” of 
the defendant illustrate the potential implications for the ICC of similar 
disagreements between the Prosecutor, the PTC and AC, and 
commentators. In New York, it is unclear whether successful treatment for 
drug addiction warrants a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice. It is 
 
 
 160. Id. at 734–35. 
 161. Id. at 735–36. 
 162. Id. at 737. 
 163. Id. at 737–38. 
 164. Id. at 738. 
 165. Id. 
 166. People v. Schellenbach, 888 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 167. Id. 
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difficult to predict, in part, because improving one’s character is only one 
factor in the mix. While rehabilitation may weigh in favor of dismissal, it 
is typically insufficient to dismiss charges of violent crime.
168
 
While it is unlikely the ICC will consider similar drug crime and 
addiction issues, the controversy in New York illustrates the amorphous 
nature of criteria related to the accused, such as “character” under New 
York law or related factors that enhanced ICC criteria might include. 
Moreover, looking at rehabilitation more broadly, the defendant’s capacity 
for rehabilitation through reintegration or the potential for reconciliation 
may well be relevant at the ICC level. In particular, consideration of 
whether the interests of justice warrant deferral to state prosecution or 
alternative justice mechanisms would likely rest in part on the character of 
the defendant vis-à-vis a form of rehabilitation. Regarding drug use 
specifically, it is possible the accused’s narcotics history will factor into a 
character assessment if the accused had been forced to use drugs prior to 
the commission of the crime. This scenario is relatively common with 
child soldiers, who may fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC for crimes 
committed after the age of eighteen.
169
 
The New York case law on the significance of successful drug 
treatment is mixed even when dealing with nonviolent drug crimes. For 
example, courts have granted motions to dismiss in the interests of justice 
where the defendant completed residential treatment and obtained 
employment or overcame a drug addiction.
170
 An appellate court went 
further in taking into account not only the defendant’s personal 
rehabilitation, but also public criticism of New York’s harsh drug laws in 
dismissing drug charges in furtherance of justice.
171
 
On the other hand, a New York appellate court reversed a dismissal of 
drug charges where the defendant successfully completed treatment. 
Noting that the defendant’s motion was based mainly on completion of the 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 630 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85–86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 169. ICC accused Dominic Ongwen, currently under arrest warrant from the ICC, illustrates the 
potential for a scenario like this. His status as an abducted child turned Lord’s Resistance Army 
commander has given rise to arguments that prosecution and punishment at the ICC is inappropriate 
justice for Ongwen and his victims. Justice and Reconciliation Project, Complicating Victims and 
Perpetrators in Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen, JRP Field Note 7 (July 2008), available at www.hu 
mansecuritygateway.com/documents/JRP_dominicongwen.pdf. 
 170. See People v. Brown, 681 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (granting motion to 
dismiss where the defendant completed residential treatment and obtained employment); People v. 
Bruno, No. 4947/02, 2006 WL 1045065, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006) (unpublished table 
decision) (dismissing drug possession charges where the defendant overcame a ten-year addiction to 
drugs and no longer posed a threat to the safety or welfare of the community through criminal drug 
use).  
 171. People v. Marrow, 798 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
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program, the court held (without providing any reasoning) that this failed 
to establish a compelling factor.
172
 Similarly, a trial court considering a 
motion in the furtherance of justice dismissed defendant’s argument about 
the “Draconian effect” of drug laws with “[s]o be it.”173 
Instead of clarifying when dismissals in the interest of justice are 
warranted based on the improved character of drug offenders under section 
210.40(1)(d), the case law provides little clarity or predictability. By 
contrast, the outcome may depend on a mix of factors particular to the 
individual defendant. More troubling, it appears that the outcome can 
depend on the attitude of the judge(s) regarding rehabilitation and the 
severity of New York’s drug laws. Other issues related to the defendant’s 
character that are more relevant to the ICC, such as capacity for 
reintegration or status as a former abductee or child soldier, may engender 
similar opposing attitudes. Such disparate reasoning and outcomes could 
lead to accusations of arbitrariness at the domestic or international level. 
The character of the defendant is not the only part of section 
210.40(1)(d) that illustrates the danger of explanations based on vague 
criteria. Section 210.40(1)(d) also includes calls for consideration of the 
“condition” of the defendant, including physical condition, infirmity, or 
illness. The interpretation of “condition” is contested within the New York 
courts and by commentators. Likewise, it is unclear how age, infirmity, or 
related considerations might be expected to influence the interests of 
justice under the Rome Statute.  
In New York, the early days of the AIDS epidemic led to many 
motions to dismiss in furtherance of justice based, in whole or in part, on 
illness. The New York courts have been criticized for being too stingy in 
granting such motions.
174
 New York courts do occasionally grant a 
dismissal when a defendant’s life expectancy does not exceed the time 
anticipated for trial or the likely sentence upon conviction;
175
 it is 
otherwise unlikely, especially if other factors weigh against dismissal. The 
standard has evolved to require defendants to be “literally at death’s door” 
such that incarceration would hasten death or be “grossly inhumane” for 
 
 
 172. People v. McIlwain, 751 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 173. People v. O’Neill, 379 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 174. Wirenius, supra note 96, at 218. 
 175. See, e.g., People v. Camargo, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (defendant’s 
life expectancy was shorter than the time needed for trial); cf. People v. Wong, 642 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (affirming dismissal where defendant would probably “not survive the 
minimum term of imprisonment” for the charge, although the court states that this factor alone would 
not lead to dismissal). 
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the court to grant dismissal.
176
 A defendant who cannot provide evidence 
of an extremely dire medical situation is not given the benefit of a 
compassionate dismissal. As a result, commentators have criticized New 
York courts for discriminatorily backtracking on the use of compassionate 
dismissals for illness.
177
  
The history of New York illness cases demonstrates the controversy 
over whether the courts are properly exercising their discretion when 
considering the “condition” of the accused. The level of illness required 
for the court to consider the circumstances exceptional is unclear. Even if 
the decisions are warranted because a less stringent standard might 
undermine criminal justice (e.g., by encouraging crimes by some 
terminally ill but not completely incapacitated defendants), the illness 
cases can be problematic. They now hinge on a determination beyond the 
competence of the criminal justice system: the life expectancy of the 
accused.  
Courts cannot adopt a compassionate release policy as part of the 
interests of justice, even one relying on medical opinions of life 
expectancy, without controversy. Case in point: Abdel Basset Ali al-
Megrahi, who was convicted of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 
(Lockerbie bombing).
178
 Scotland granted al-Megrahi compassionate 
release in 2009 based on medical evaluations showing his life expectancy 
to be three months.
179
 Many survivors of the Lockerbie bombing argued 
that release was inappropriate regardless of his illness or alleged short life 
expectancy.
180
 In July 2011, almost two years later, al-Megrahi was alive 
and in attendance at a pro-Qaddafi rally in Libya.
181
 He outlived Qaddafi, 
dying in May of 2012.
182
  
This illustrates the problems with criteria like the illness of the 
defendant: first, there will be disagreements over whether a short life 
expectancy is sufficient for dismissal; and second, it is difficult to 
accurately predict the course of an illness. The ICC Prosecutor has 
indicated that international justice may not be served by the prosecution of 
 
 
 176. See, e.g., People v. Bloomfield, No. 1942/01, 2002 WL 34393829, at *27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2002) and cases cited therein. 
 177. See Wirenius, supra note 96, at 219–20. 
 178. J. David Goodman & Robert Mackey, Lockerbie Convict Appears at Rally in Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 27, 2011), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/lockerbie-convict-appears-at-ral ly-
in-libya/. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Robert D. McFadden, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, Lockerbie Bomber, Dies at 60, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 21, 2012, at A24. 
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a terminally ill defendant,
183
 but he or she will likely face the same 
challenges as New York and Scotland in applying this factor. Therefore, 
the experience of New York demonstrates that divergent interpretations of 
vague criteria may create controversy, and analogous controversy may 
diminish the benefits of adopting enhanced criteria at the ICC.  
3. Lack of Agreement on Goals of Prosecution 
Finally, the ICC faces challenges similar to New York in discerning 
agreement on the goals of prosecution and their relative weight. The 
underlying purposes of the criminal justice system should propel the 
exercise of discretion in the interests of justice. In New York, it should 
drive the balancing process of the ten factors, but there is a significant 
impediment: there is little consensus on the purposes of prosecution or 
how to balance them. There is no coherent criminal justice theory 
underpinning the interpretation of the section 210.40(1) factors or their 
application to certain facts. Instead, New York courts are left to pick and 
choose from among several theories when considering “the purpose and 
effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the 
offense” under section 210.40(1)(f).184 
New York legislation provides that the purpose of the penal law is 
prevention “through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, 
the rehabilitation of those convicted, the promotion of their successful and 
productive reentry and reintegration into society, and their confinement 
when required in the interests of public protection.”185 Courts considering 
section 210.40 dismissals often refer to four recognized purposes under 
section 210.40(1)(f): “retribution, rehabilitation, isolation and 
deterrence.”186 How they interpret and weigh these four purposes, 
however, varies. 
For instance, in People v. Vecchio, the trial court granted a motion to 
dismiss drug possession charges, citing the four purposes of 
punishment.
187
 The court noted that deterrence has largely failed, but is 
still considered the default response to crime.
188
 It examined rehabilitation 
 
 
 183. 2007 Policy Paper, supra note 5, at 7. 
 184. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1)(f) (McKinney 2011). 
 185. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney 2011). 
 186. See, e.g., People v. Harmon, 586 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (citation 
omitted). 
 187. People v. Vecchio, 526 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987), aff’d, 535 N.Y.S.2d 537 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988).  
 188. Id. at 701. 
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programs and concluded that non-incarceration-based programs seem 
more effective at reducing recidivism.
189
 As a result, defendant’s entry into 
a rehabilitation program should be rewarded even if it is post-arrest.
190
 The 
court dismissed two counts of drug charges, enabling a probationary 
sentence where the defendant could finish his outside rehabilitation 
program.
191
 It found that this rehabilitation would be a benefit to everyone, 
while incarceration for several years would “accomplish absolutely 
nothing.”192 
By contrast, in People v. Harmon, the appellate court relied on a 
different interpretation of the same four purposes to reverse a dismissal of 
drug possession charges.
193
 Although the defendant had dyslexia and 
suffered from other “unfortunate” circumstances, his return to the same 
location (presumably seeking illegal drugs) showed that he needed to be 
taught that he could not ignore the drug laws with impunity.
194
 The 
Harmon court saw a felony conviction as necessary to deter the defendant 
and others, despite recognizing that the defendant needed help.
195
 In fact, 
the court viewed conviction and sentencing as the appropriate vehicle for 
getting the defendant the help he needed.
196
 Only a few years earlier, the 
Vecchio court saw incarceration as having a negative effect rather than a 
rehabilitative one.
197
 Although other facts were also considered, both 
courts relied on the same four purposes of punishment, but interpreted and 
weighed them in distinctly different ways.
198
 
In other cases, the courts emphasize one of the four purposes of 
punishment without any explanation. In People v. Watson, the court relied 
on deterrence (specific and general) in denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss child endangerment charges.
199
 The court stated: “In the event that 
a dismissal is granted, the defendant, or any other person, may think it 
acceptable to leave small children at home without proper supervision.”200 
In People v. Murray, the court referred to “security, deterrence and 
 
 
 189. Id. at 702. 
 190. Id. at 699, 703. 
 191. Id. at 703. 
 192. Id. at 701–03. 
 193. People v. Harmon, 586 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 703. 
 198. Even if the charge in Harmon eventually led to probation, similar to the expected outcome in 
Vecchio, the court’s reasoning was distinct; as a result, it would be difficult to predict which 
interpretation of the theories of prosecution and punishment would prevail in the future. 
 199. People v. Watson, 700 N.Y.S.2d 651, 658 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999). 
 200. Id. at 652. 
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rehabilitation” under section 210.40(1)(f), but the need to incarcerate the 
defendant to protect society from a serious crime was determinative in the 
court’s denial of the motion.201 
If incapacitation were the most important purpose, then one would 
expect to see courts granting compassionate dismissals based on whether 
the defendant was capable of posing a danger to the public, rather than 
whether he was at death’s door. If the key purpose were rehabilitation, 
then courts would grant motions to dismiss based on successful drug 
treatment regardless of the type of drug-related crime or whether the 
program was entered into post-arrest. On the other hand, if the paramount 
purpose were retribution, then dismissals in the interest of justice would be 
determined after an analysis of whether the defendant deserved 
punishment based on his culpability, not his physical illness or addiction 
status.  
If deterrence were the key consideration, then courts would grant 
dismissals depending on the impossible calculus of whether the defendant 
or others would perceive the dismissal as an invitation to commit future 
crimes. Given the criticisms of the rational actor model underlying 
deterrence in general,
202
 the courts might interpret deterrence in varying 
ways.
203
 Furthermore, the intersection of rehabilitation and specific 
deterrence theories would support far more dismissals of drug charges 
based on successful drug treatment. If various theories support 
prosecution, then consistency and predictability should be predicated on 
an agreed hierarchy of justifications currently lacking in New York case 
law. 
The disparate New York case law bears out deGuzman’s theory that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to develop consistent guidance without 
agreement on the underlying purpose of the criminal justice system.
204
 The 
inconsistency across courts when identifying and interpreting the proper 
purposes of prosecution and punishment may lead to accusations of 
arbitrariness and bias. Moreover, the purpose of prosecution and 
punishment is only one of ten vague criteria open to inconsistent 
 
 
 201. People v. Murray, 634 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987–88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In fact, the court 
concludes that the motion to dismiss should be denied on this ground, but nevertheless goes on to 
discuss the subsequent factors. Id. at 988. 
 202. James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: 
Predicting the Court’s impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2009) (discussing deterrence and the 
rationality assumption). 
 203. See, e.g., People v. Vecchio, 526 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987), aff’d, 535 
N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (citing recognition of the failure of deterrence-based sentencing). 
 204. See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text. 
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interpretations. If the purpose of the prosecution guided the interpretation 
of the ambiguous criteria, rather than standing as a (confusing) factor on 
its own, the remaining factors would be more successful in limiting 
arbitrariness and increasing predictability. Instead, section 210.40(1)(f) of 
the New York statute is also ambiguous, with courts giving different 
interpretations to various purposes and according them varying 
significance. New York jurisprudence shows that the implementation of 
more detailed factors for interests of justice without a shared, underlying 
theory is problematic, to say the least. 
As has been discussed elsewhere,
205
 the underlying purposes of the ICC 
are not entirely clear. Prevention, deterrence, retribution, restorative 
justice, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and expressivism have all been cited 
as potential goals of the ICC.
206
 But there is as yet no agreement on the 
paramount purpose or purposes of the ICC, the preference for 
prosecution,
207
 or how to consider potentially competing interests.
208
 The 
goals of the ICC, and specifically the purpose of prosecution, are likely 
candidates for enhanced interests of justice criteria.
209
 If they are not 
adopted as separate criteria, they are likely to guide the interpretation of 
the other factors. If enhanced criteria are intended to increase the 
transparency and legitimacy of the ICC, it is crucial for the ICC and its 
stakeholders to reach agreement on underlying principles to avoid the 
contradictory results exemplified by the New York jurisprudence. 
In sum, the three lessons derived from New York are likely to carry 
over to the ICC context despite the differences between New York 
criminal law and the Rome Statute. First, although the judiciary is the sole 
decision-maker in New York, the difficulty of providing consistently 
thorough explanations would apply with equal force to the ICC 
Prosecutor, the PTC, or the AC. Similarly, the complexities of 
implementing criteria for an inherently nebulous concept such as the 
interests of justice will remain whether in New York (where statutory 
criteria are applied by the courts) or in the ICC (where prosecutorial 
guidelines might be adopted by the Prosecutor, perhaps reviewed by the 
 
 
 205. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 19, at 300–01. 
 206. See, e.g., Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court 
and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 265–78 (2008). 
 207. The OTP has mentioned the prevention of impunity. See 2007 Policy Paper, supra note 5, at 
4, 8–9. This, however, goes to the preference for prosecution in general rather than criteria for 
determining when the exceptional case for non-prosecution might exist. 
 208. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 209. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 62, at 335–44 (suggesting international peace and security, 
transitional justice, and deterrence as relevant factors). 
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PTC and AC, and critiqued by respected and influential commentators). 
Such disagreements over the proper interpretation of vague criteria may 
undermine legitimacy by highlighting discrepancies and yielding 
unpredictable outcomes. Finally, both New York and the international 
community have failed to articulate a shared vision of the underlying 
principles of criminal justice, particularly the purposes of prosecution and 
punishment. As a result, it is difficult to avoid accusations of arbitrariness 
in interpreting ambiguous criteria, whether at the domestic or international 
level. 
The experience of New York, therefore, lends support to those 
skeptical of the adoption of specific criteria for ICC declinations in the 
interests of justice. Greenawalt intimates that it is impossible to adopt 
satisfactory criteria for inherently complex and ambiguous concepts.
210
 
The New York statutory factors and case law seem to support the 
argument that such criteria are difficult to craft and may actually backfire 
by encouraging more disagreement when interpreting and applying the 
criteria. Similarly, deGuzman fears that the use of additional “malleable” 
criteria will merely emphasize the inconsistency of decisions.
211
 As a 
result, increased transparency may actually undermine legitimacy.
212
 The 
cases discussed above highlight the courts’ inconsistencies when 
interpreting the factors, which could decrease the decision-maker’s 
legitimacy. 
On the other hand, even skeptics may think that increased exploration 
of discretion may be beneficial. Goldston, despite his misgivings, 
concludes that prosecutorial guidelines may beneficially illuminate the 
difficulty of decisions and the complex calculus of considerations 
involved.
213
 One commentator on New York’s “furtherance of justice” 
provision, Sheila Kles, rejected a dissenting opinion in the New York 
Court of Appeals, which warned of “the futility of developing all-
encompassing rules to cover all situations of injustice.”214 Kles countered: 
“The presence of a standard to apply in using these dismissals will, by its 
existence, limit arbitrariness. A standard compels reflection upon the 
reasons for a dismissal rather than simply permitting a mere statement that 
a case was dismissed ‘in furtherance of justice.’”215 
 
 
 210. Greenawalt, supra note 70.  
 211. deGuzman, supra note 19, at 296–99. 
 212. Id. at 298–99. 
 213. Goldston, supra note 14, at 406. 
 214. Kles, supra note 92, at 470 (citing People v. Belge, 359 N.E.2d 377, 377 (N.Y. 1976) (Jason, 
J., dissenting) (per curiam)).  
 215. Id. 
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There is something to be said for the argument that some kind of 
criteria is necessary to forestall the exercise of discretion based on nothing 
but a conclusory statement. Unfortunately, the New York courts have still 
utilized conclusory statements on more than one occasion, particularly for 
denials. Moreover, the ICC does not face virtually unbounded judicial 
discretion like New York did prior to the adoption of the section 210.40(1) 
factors. The Rome Statute provides at least a few enumerated factors for 
the Prosecutor to consider when determining whether to decline to 
prosecute in the interests of justice. Those who are calling for further 
criteria advocate that additional factors would be beneficial. The 
experience of New York, however, strongly suggests that further factors 
might do more harm than good. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators differ on whether the adoption of detailed prosecutorial 
guidelines for “interests of justice” determinations will enhance the 
legitimacy of the ICC. An examination of the New York experience 
implementing specific criteria for dismissals in furtherance of justice 
shows that adoption of factors is not a panacea.  
The New York statutory factors and case law teach three specific 
lessons on mandating more detailed criteria for the ICC’s decisions 
regarding declination to prosecute. First, even a statutory requirement to 
explain judicial reasoning may not yield the desired transparency. As 
illustrated by several New York cases and criticism of the ICC, decision-
makers are apt to reach conclusions without providing satisfactory 
rationales. Second, while guideposts may be useful, they may instead 
provide more fodder for disagreement on the merits. This may lead to 
more controversy, rather than less, particularly concerning broad, 
ambiguous criteria such as that related to the defendant’s history, 
character, and condition. Finally, the lack of a guiding theory to drive the 
interpretation of ambiguous criteria can produce contradictory or 
unpredictable results.  
Nonetheless, commentators seem to expect ICC entities to provide 
thorough and effective rationales for decisions even though they have no 
such duty. Outside stakeholders make high demands as demonstrated by 
the criticism of the Prosecutor’s pronouncements and the Court’s decisions 
regarding gravity. While often acknowledging that there is no requirement 
that the ICC offer further reasoning, academics continue to propose that 
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better explanations would improve the ICC’s credibility.216 As a result, it 
is possible that the recently sworn-in Prosecutor will seriously consider 
adopting expanded interests of justice criteria in the near future, despite 
the risks.  
The precise contours of such criteria are beyond the scope of this 
article, but some suggestions can be made based on the experience of New 
York. First, there must be full buy-in from the new Prosecutor and her 
office regarding implementation of any prosecutorial guidelines, including 
a genuine commitment to full explanations of its decisions, even those that 
reveal policy choices that are not made in a purely legalistic, technical 
manner. The Prosecutor might even consider an internal or external review 
board to facilitate this process, though this might prove too intrusive.
217
 A 
more palatable approach might be to allow some of the stakeholders, 
including the defense and victims, to offer their thoughts on the issue in a 
more formal process.
218
  
In addition, both the ICC and its stakeholders must accept some 
apparent inconsistency in outcome, recognizing that each situation will 
differ, and that context matters. The focus should be less on the outcome 
and more on the efforts of the Prosecutor to provide explanations. 
Furthermore, interested parties must accept that reasonable minds can 
differ when interpreting amorphous criteria. Criteria related to the interests 
of justice could be fleshed out with examples of various scenarios related 
to each factor in order to provide a framework for discussing nebulous 
concepts like the defendant’s role or character.  
In particular, an effort should be made to work toward common 
understandings of “justice” in terms of the ICC’s goals, and specifically 
regarding the purposes of prosecution. The projects of adopting 
prosecutorial guidelines and agreeing on the underlying purpose of the 
ICC should work hand in hand, so that any prosecutorial guidelines reflect 
a shared vision of the ICC (as proposed by deGuzman).
219
 Accordingly, 
the ICC could potentially avoid the confusing situation whereby New 
York courts appear to manipulate the breadth of the purposes of 
 
 
 216. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
 217. Cf. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2011) 
(exploring ways to encourage disclosure and transparency of declinations of prosecution based on the 
belief that the law is wrong or application of the law to that particular defendant or in that particular 
context would be wrong, i.e., prosecutorial nullification). 
 218. Id. at 1279 (suggesting a “formal opportunity for the victim, law enforcement, and, in 
appropriate cases, even the defense counsel to lobby the prosecutor who signals that she is considering 
nullification in a given case”). 
 219. deGuzman, supra note 19, at 312 (advocating expressivism as the central theory on which to 
build consensus). 
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punishment in order to reach conclusions based on individual conceptions 
of good law.
220
 Keeping in mind the potential pitfalls illustrated by the 
implementation of “interests of justice” criteria in New York, the 
Prosecutor could work with the international community toward 
agreement on a shared understanding of the “interests of justice” and 
concomitant prosecutorial guidelines to see that vision come to fruition.  
In weighing whether to heed the calls for enhanced prosecutorial 
guidelines, the Prosecutor should consider the cautionary lessons offered 
by the experience of New York about overestimating the potential 
advantages of adopting further criteria for such a fraught and complex 
decision as determining the interests of justice. 
 
 
 220. Drug crime cases exemplified this problem, as judges seem to reach conclusions based on 
their personal views toward drug policy. See discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
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